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Introduction 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the efficacies of the developments of Basel regulation on 
both the banking system, small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) as well as the overall economy 
of ten Countries: a group of eight European Countries where Basel regulation is fully implemented 
(Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and two Anglo-
Saxon Countries where the above regulation is only partially implemented (USA and UK). In fact, if 
on one hand, the main objectives of Basel regulation are those of strengthening transparency and 
accountability, enhancing sound regulation, promoting integrity in financial markets, reinforcing 
international cooperation and reforming international financial institutions; on the other hand, the 
G20 leaders committed to ensuring that regulation is efficient, that it does not impede financial 
innovation and it supports the expansion of trade in financial services . We aim to contribute to the 
current literature debate with two research questions. The first one is a comparison of two systems 
(the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon ones) with different levels of application of the 
regulation itself and different corporate financial systems (the Anglo Saxon Countries being more 
capital market oriented while the European Countries being more banking centered). This is 
performed by intersecting two dimensions: the level of banks’ financing, which is a proxy for the true 
banks’ credit allocation ability and an innovative rating methodology (Mantovani and Castellan, 
2015). The higher the intersection, the more efficient the country in allocating credit to SMEs. The 
second one is another comparison within the Countries, based on the level of efficiency according to 
Fisher Separation Theorem (1930) and the efficiency by Fama (1965). 
We find several interesting results. First, we observe heterogeneity in the mix of explanatory variables 
for the asset-side capability of firms to perform in the long run. This has potential implications for 
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the banking system because the current framework of Basel regulation is a one size fits all solution 
and banks of different Countries may require different credit ratings solution dependent on the inner 
characteristics of the corporate system of the specific country. 
Second, we find that in the two Anglo-Saxon Countries (USA, UK) the allocation efficacy of the 
banking system is higher than that of Europe. This may mean that the competition of capital markets 
is stronger than regulation itself. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following sections: literature review, sample and 
methodology of analysis, empirical results, discussion and conclusions. 
Market failures and Basel regulations: a literature review 
The Basel Banking Accords are norms issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BSBC) under the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland.  
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision was founded in 1974 by central bank governors of G10 
countries. Its aim was to increase financial stability and the quality of banking supervision worldwide 
by setting minimum standards for the regulation and the supervision of banks. Capital adequacy soon 
became the main focus of the Committee’s activities and in 1988 the Basel Capital Accord (also 
known as Basel I) was approved. It required a minimum capital ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
of 8%. The Accord was always evolving over time, and in 1999 the Committee issued a new Revised 
Capital Accord, (Basel II) which entered into force in 2004. Basel I, because of its simplicity and its 
underestimation of risks, was substituted by the new Accord. 
The new framework was designed to improve the way in which regulatory capital requirements 
reflect underlying risks and to better address the financial innovation that had occurred in recent years. 
The changes aimed at rewarding and encouraging continuous improvements in risk measurement and 
control2. 
Given to financial crisis in 2010 the Basel Committee issued another accord, Basel III, with the 
purpose to improve the resilience of financial markets3. The implementation of Basel III started from 
January 2014; limited to the risk-based capital requirements. 
Since the introduction of Basel II, it was predicted that large banks would have adopt an Internal 
Rating Based (IRB) system substituting the Standardized Approach (SA). Based on an analysis of 
Belgian banks, Masschelein (2003) concludes that IRBs seem to imply lower capital requirements 
thanks to more efficiency in measuring risks. Similarly, Allen et al. (2004) show that adopting a credit 
scoring system allows for a faster and less costly investment valuation. Berger et al. (2005), Cowan 
and Cowan (2006) and Frame et al. (2001) go a step further and, in analyzing the US market, conclude 
that adopting an external credit scoring system increases SMEs financing. For instance, Berger et al. 
(2005) find in a sample of US banks that the adoption of an external credit system contributed to a 
significant increase in SMEs financing over a three years cycle. Similar results were also reached by 
Cowan and Cowan (2006) who used a survey methodology for their analysis, and by Frame et al. 
(2001).  
A larger issue is to determine which rating system to utilize (quantitative, qualitative or a mix of 
both). The literature concerning pure quantitative analysis is relatively well developed and it mainly 
concerns models of corporate bankruptcy prediction (Beaver, 1966; Altman 1968; Altman et al., 
1977; Platt and Platt, 1990). Because of their relatively high discriminatory power, they are well 
accepted by the industry even if they present some disadvantages such as the lack of a theory that 
explains why and how certain financial factors are linked to corporate bankruptcy. 
Given this unresolved puzzle in the literature, we notice that all studies focus mainly on the 
implication of Basel regulation to banks’ capital requirement and little has been written on the issue 
of modelling credit risk specifically for SMEs. We aim to contribute to this issue by investigating two 
levels of efficacy of the Basel agreements: among Countries where regulation is different and within 
Countries where regulation is applied. In fact, our first research question is: 
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RQ1: how a set of Countries, where Basel accords are partially implemented (UK and USA), 
compares to a set of Countries where Basel regulation has been fully implemented (Italy, France, 
Spain, Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic)? 
 
The comparison analysis relates to the level of overlap between the amounts of financing actually 
received by companies (which, for the second group of Countries is a proxy for Basel regulation) and 
the merit of credit as assigned by an innovative forward-looking rating system as proposed by 
Mantovani and Castellan (2015).  
Basel II introduced the possibility for banks to develop their own Internal Rating Based systems 
(IRB) next to the choice of directly using the Standardized Approach (SA), which relies on credit 
ratings of borrowers assigned by “external credit assessment institution (ECAIs)”. Both the above 
methods find their fundamentals on the concepts of probability of default, exposure at default and 
loss given default, which are well documented in the literature starting from the seminal work by 
Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) down to the more recent model by Altman and 
Sabato (2007), which is specific to SMEs. We think that one of the main shortcoming of these models 
is the fact that the horizon of analysis is limited to 12 months forwards. As stated above, we answer 
our first research question by using the methodology developed by Mantovani and Castellan (2015), 
which is forward looking by its nature and does not limit the risk assessment of a company to a one-
year horizon. We think that this is particularly important to the universe of SMEs because, often 
times, successful ideas with a high profitability potential, require a longer time horizon to develop. 
Another area of investigation of this study is the level of efficiency of the financial system in different 
Countries. In fact, we formulate the second research question: 
 
RQ2: which is the allocative contribution given by the Basel regulation within a group of Countries 
where regulation itself is applied: Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech Republic? And what about Anglo-Saxon Countries: United States and United Kingdom, where 
Basel regulations are partially applied? 
 
These Countries are classified based on their level of capital allocation efficiency. We define capital 
allocation efficiency based on the Separation Theorem by Fisher (1930), which states that, given 
perfect and complete capital markets, the production decision is governed solely by the profit-
maximization objective, while the consumption decision is governed solely by utility maximization. 
The two decisions are hence separated and independent, meanwhile the governance of risks is done 
by financial markets. 
Sample and methodology of analysis 
The sample under analysis covers data extracted from ORBIS database (edited by Bureau van Dijk4) 
for ten Countries: the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, France, 
Spain, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Specifically, it includes 
manufacturing and service firms with unconsolidated balance sheet data for total assets, operating 
revenues, fixed assets, shareholder’s funds and cost of employees, over the period from 2006 to 20135.  
The sample is made of 80,464 firms: 3,174 firms in USA, 10,803 firms in UK, 15,998 firms in 
France, 13,847 firms in Italy, 7,569 firms in Spain, 6,713 firms in Germany, 6,751 firms in Hungary, 
12,357 firms in Czech Republic, 2,051 firms in Poland and 1,201 firms in Slovakia. For each 
company, we consider a panel of 8 years data: 643,712 financial reports. Furthermore, in order to 
determine a long-term merit of credit, we used the same dataset to compute the spread between 
persistent ROI and T(ROI) trough 25 indices typically used to describe the risk profile of a corporation 
for all the 643,712 financial reports, i.e. a total of 16,092,800 data. 
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In order to answer to our first research question, we rank firms in each Country according to their 
asset-side capability to perform in the long run. Such a capability is based on an integrated view of 
each firm to generate operating returns in terms of ROI as defined in equation [1]  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 𝑡
(𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑡+ 𝑊𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑡+𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑡−1+ 𝑊𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑡−1)/2
         [1] 
 
Where 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = Earnings before interest and taxes; 𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑆 = Fixed Assets; 𝑊𝐾𝐶𝐴 = Working Capital 
 
The sustainability of the corporate performance is depicted in terms of P(ROI) - T(ROI) difference, 
which is a proxy of the long term merit of credit for the firm according to Mantovani and Castellan 
(2015). T(ROI) is the long term threshold ROI adjusted on a series of ratios that aim to capture ex 
ante corporate risk (see Appendix – Table 1 and Table 2). T(ROI) is based on the confident equivalent, 
an original evolution of certainty equivalent proposed by Lintner (1965) to assess values incomplete 
markets. 
To rank the firms' merit of credit, the zero level of the proxy [P(ROI) - T(ROI)] is considered. 
The higher the gap, the higher is the merit of credit. Then, this ranking is intersected with two 
indicators arranged around their median levels: 1) the Intensity of debt (equation [2]), as a proxy for 
the efficiency of the banking system to allocate the quantity of credit; 2) Price of Financing (equation 
[3]), as a proxy for the efficiency of the banking system to determine the price of credit allowances.  
 
Intensity of debt = 𝐷𝐸𝐵/𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡 =
[(𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑡
∗+𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑡−1
∗ ) / 2] 
𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡                                                       [2] 
Price of Financing = 𝐼𝑁𝑇/𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑡 =
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑡  
[(𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑡
∗+𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑡−1
∗ ) / 2]
      [3] 
 
Where: 𝐺𝐹𝑃 = Gross Financial Position = Loans + Long term debt; 𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸 = Operating Revenue 
𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐷 = Total Shareholder Funds 
 
This comparison will result with a set of two matrices made of four quadrants. They allow us to 
determine the overlap between the true banks’ credit allocation ability (horizontal matrix direction), 
with the optimal allocation as determined by the integrated rating methodology (vertical matrix 
direction). The two matrices are reported in the following box. 
 
Table 1: Overlaps between Long Term Merit of Credit and Intensity of debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive Negative
Higher
I. Firms with positive rating that 
raise more financial resources 
than sample average
II. Firms with negative rating 
that raise more financial 
resources than sample average
Lower
III. Firms with positive rating 
that raise less financial 
resources than sample average
IV. Firms with negative rating 
that raise less financial 
resources than sample average
ROI - T(ROI)
DEB/OPREt
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Table 2: Overlaps between Long Term Merit of Credit and Price of Financing 
 
 
Countries are ranked according to three evidences emerging from the two matrixes: 
1) Risk of Default (II quadrant of the quantity matrix), which indicates the percentage of firms 
that are given credit by the banking system, while the rating system assigns to them a negative 
ranking. This indicator reflects the potential “bad debt” for the banking system of the Country. 
2) Missing opportunities: for this topic, we started from the III quadrant of the quantity matrix 
(which indicates the percentage of firms, which are not given credit by the banking system, 
while the rating system assigns to them a positive ranking) and we adjusted it by the real 
expected GDP growth of each Country. So, we found the opportunity cost of missing GPD 
growth for each Country. 
3) Inefficient Debt Pricing (quadrant II over the sum of quadrants II & III of the price matrix), 
which indicates the percentage of firms that underpay their financial risks (quadrant II) over 
the total amount of mispriced bank allowances (quadrants II and III). 
 
For research question two, we initially perform a series of panel regression to verify the level of 
efficiency of each Country under analysis, according to two steps.  
As first, we tested the Fisher Separation Theorem (1930). The Capital Allocation Efficiency is 
supposed when there is no significant relationship between the return on investment (𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡) and the 
current mix of risks within a corporation but, at the same time, there is a significant relationship 
(adjusted R-squared greater than 10%) between the intensity of debt (Equation [2]) and corporate 
risks. In fact, in this situation, investment and financing decisions are independent. Entrepreneurs can 
be indifferent toward risks in their decision processes, since the investors control the level of risk by 
building up portfolio adjusted to their risk tolerance. To test this first block of the efficiency puzzle, 
we run two regressions: the former between 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡 (Equation [1]) and set of proxies of corporate 
risks; the latter between the Intensity of debt (Equation [2]) and the set of proxies. 
As second, the financing efficiency, according to Fama (1970) standards, is considered. The 
strong form of efficiency cannot be detected, because the relations between expected returns and 
expected risks cannot be easily tested at the empirical level. Hence, only three tests are conducted: (i) 
semi strong form of efficiency, when financing decisions are dependent only on the current level of 
risks; (ii) weak form of efficiency, when financing decisions are also related to past risks; (iii) absence 
of efficiency, when there is no relationship between firm financing and its risks meanwhile there is 
evidence of a strong autocorrelation with past financing.  
Following are the three panel regression models adopted for both the first step (ROI as dependent 
variable) and the second one (Intensity of debt as dependent variable): 
 
i. Semi strong form of efficiency:  Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + εi,t 
ii. Weak form of efficiency:  Yi,t =  β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 
iii. Absence of efficiency:   Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 
 
Positive Negative
Lower
I. Firms with positive rating that 
pay less for their raised financial 
resources
II. Firms with negative rating 
that pay less for their raised 
financial resources
Higher
III. Firms with positive rating 
that pay more for their raised 
financial resources
IV. Firms with negative rating 
that pay more for their raised 
financial resources
ROI - T(ROI)
INT/DEBt
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If a Country is not efficient at the first step, any regression for Intensity of debt will show low levels 
of adjusted R-squared. In this case, corporate managers have to intervene to adjust unfit equilibrium 
and higher than 10% adjusted R-squared in regressions for ROI are expected. The same Country 
should miss the second step as well, showing higher adjusted R-squared for the second and the third 
regressions (“weak” and “absence”) if compared with the first (“semi-strong”), when run over the 
Intensity of debt.  
Finally, we try to match empirical evidence from the two research questions. We compare the 
level of efficiency of the financial system with the of overlap between the true banks’ credit allocation 
capacity and the forward looking credit allocation methodology, as it results from investigations for 
research question one. If different but coherent evidences will emerge for the European and Anglo-
Saxon Countries, than the Basel Regulation may not be the right gateway to an efficient debt market. 
Empirical results  
In order to answer to the first research question, we need to calculate T(ROI) (Mantovani and 
Castellan, 2015). Under a methodological point of view, this consists of applying a particular 
regression (Predictive Regression, here below, as in equation [4]) to each of the ten Countries in order 
to find the statistically significant indicators, which has the highest predictive power to estimate the 
future confident equivalent around ROI. The dependent variable is represented by the return on 
investment (ROIi,t), while the independent variables (the vectors 𝑋𝑖,𝑡) are a set of indices that are 
typically used to describe the risk profile of a corporation. They include operational risks, such as the 
degree of operating leverage and the absolute intensity of working capital, technological risks such 
as the absolute intensity of fixed assets and financial risks such as financial leverage and long-term 
debt rate (see Appendix – Table 1). For each of this independent variable, we consider the 
autoregressive component, also.  
ROIi,t =  β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t         [4] 
 
Table 3 presents the regression for each Country using to calculate T(ROI). 
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Table 3: Predictive Regressions for each Country 
 
 
 
 
const 0.1748 *** const 0.1205 *** const 0.0731 *** const 0.1977 *** const 0.0701 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt 0.0003 ** WKCA/OPREt-1 -0.1608 *** CA/FIASt 0.0005 *** CA/CLt-1 0.0065 *** FIAS/OPREt 0.0140 ***
(0.0132) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0089) (0.0000)
EBIT/INTt 0.0000 ** FIAS/OPREt 0.0120 *** DOLt (price) -0.0005 *** WKCA/OPREt 0.0189 *** DEB/EQUITYt -0.0046 ***
(0.0158) (0.0001) (0.0076) (0.0009) (0.0040)
ROSt 0.1057 *** DOLt (price) 0.0018 *** FIAS/OPREt -0.0009 *** WKCA/OPREt-1 -0.0514 ** ROEt 0.0540 ***
(0.0000) (0.0041) (0.0000) (0.0217) (0.0000)
TAXt 0.0373 * EBIT/INTt 0.0001 *** DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0023 *** LEVt -0.0034 ** ROSt 0.5599 ***
(0.0760) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0361) (0.0000)
R-squared EBIT/INTt-1 0.0001 *** DEB/EQUITYt -0.0008 *** DEB/OPREt-1 0.0026 * ROSt-1 0.1899 ***
Adj. R-squared (0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0660) --- (0.0000)
F-stat (pvalue) ROEt 0.0128 *** DEB/EQUITYt-1 -0.0008 *** ROEt 0.0167 *** R-squared
(0.0038) --- (0.0031) (0.0005) Adj. R-squared
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0456 *** ROEt 0.0437 *** ROEt-1 0.0277 *** F-stat (pvalue)
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROEt-1 0.0121 *** ROEt-1 0.0326 *** EBIT/INTt 0.0000 ***
(0.0050) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROSt 0.8364 *** EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 *** EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0025) (0.0001)
R-squared ROSt 0.0923 *** ROSt-1 0.0037 *
Adj. R-squared (0.0000) (0.0580)
F-stat (pvalue) ROSt-1 0.0177 *** R-squared
(0.0000) Adj. R-squared
AV/STAFt 0.0006 *** F-stat (pvalue)
(0.0057)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0008 ***
(0.0001)
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
F-stat (pvalue)
0.0000 0.0021
0.0009
0.0009
0.0000
0.0141
0.0141
CZECH REPUBLIC GERMANY SPAIN
0.0000
0.0641
0.0642
0.0021
0.0000
FRANCE HUNGARY
0.0458
0.0458
0.0000
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const 0.0995 *** DEB/EBITDAt-1 -0.0002 * const 0.0959 *** const 0.0947 ** const 0.1490 *** const -0.0664 **
(0.0000) (0.0649) (0.0000) (0.0228) (0.0000) (0.0227)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0002 *** DEB/EQUITYt-1 -0.0014 *** CA/CLt-1 0.0094 ** CA/FIASt-1 0.0048 *** CA/FIASt 0.0002 ** CA/FIASt -0.0595 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0469) (0.0030) (0.0120) (0.0000)
CA/CLt 0.0131 *** ROEt 0.0210 *** FIAS/OPREt-1 -0.0143 ** WKCA/FIASt-1 -0.0051 ** CA/FIASt-1 0.0003 ** WKCA/OPREt-1 0.0610 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0484) (0.0300) (0.0173) (0.0000)
FCFO/OPREt 0.0108 *** ROEt-1 0.0142 *** ROEt 0.0466 *** DOLt (price) -0.0107 *** WKCA/FIASt -0.0005 * WKCA/FIASt 0.0773 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0580) (0.0000)
DOLt (volume) -0.0001 * EBIT/INTt 0.0000 *** ROEt-1 0.0378 *** DOLt-1 (price) 0.0115 *** ROSt 0.6588 *** INT/DEBt -0.0145 ***
(0.0509) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0028)
DOLt (price) -0.0008 *** EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 *** EBIT/INTt 0.0001 *** EBIT/INTt-1 0.0013 *** ROSt-1 0.7050 *** DEB/OPREt 0.0222 ***
(0.0022) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DOLt-1 (price) -0.0005 * ROSt 0.4515 *** ROSt 0.9930 *** R-squared 0.0159 AV/STAFt 0.0149 * DEB/OPREt-1 0.0126 ***
(0.0831) (0.0000) (0.0000) Adj. R-squared 0.0159 (0.0984) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0172 *** ROSt-1 0.0652 *** CRED-DEBDt -0.0086 *** F-stat (pvalue) 0.0000 AV/STAFt-1 -0.0172 * ROEt-1 -0.0209 ***
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0534) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 -0.0130 *** TAXt 0.0051 ** R-squared R-squared 0.0075 EBIT/INTt 0.0001 ***
(0.0000) (0.0129) Adj. R-squared Adj. R-squared 0.0075 (0.0000)
INT/DEBt 0.0005 * TAXt-1 0.0023 * F-stat (pvalue) F-stat (pvalue) 0.0000 AV/STAFt 0.0022 ***
(0.0832) (0.0887) (0.0077)
DEB/OPREt 0.0180 *** RLFAt -0.0001 * R-squared 0.0515
(0.0002) (0.0605) Adj. R-squared 0.0514
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0315 *** RFLAt-1 -0.0002 ** F-stat (pvalue) 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0430)
DEB/EBITDAt -0.0002 ** R-squared
(0.0389) Adj. R-squared
F-stat (pvalue)
SLOVAKIA
0.0256
0.0256
0.0000
POLAND
0.0380
0.0380
0.0000
UK USAITALY
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Once T(ROI) is calculated, firms are ranked based on the variable [P(ROI) – T(ROI)], which is the 
proxy for their long term merit of credit according to Mantovani and Castellan (2015). The ranking 
is compared to the effective debt allocation by banks. Table 4 presents the resulting empiricals based  
on tables 1 and 2, which intersect the above three dimensions. 
 
Table 4: Allocative matrices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
positive negative positive negative
higher 10.74% 46.71% higher 10.47% 41.98%
lower 18.55% 23.99% lower 20.80% 26.75%
positive negative positive negative
lower 11.72% 37.21% lower 10.68% 41.16%
higher 17.58% 33.49% higher 20.59% 27.57%
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBTC
Z
E
C
H
 R
E
P
U
B
L
IC
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
positive negative positive negative
higher 8.55% 43.11% higher 13.47% 40.38%
lower 21.29% 27.05% lower 22.56% 23.60%
positive negative positive negative
lower 12.28% 38.27% lower 16.61% 34.01%
higher 17.56% 31.89% higher 19.35% 30.03%
S
P
A
IN
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
F
R
A
N
C
E
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
positive negative positive negative
higher 13.25% 38.98% higher 8.44% 41.81%
lower 20.06% 27.71% lower 21.10% 28.65%
positive negative positive negative
lower 13.01% 38.25% lower 10.51% 39.70%
higher 20.26% 28.48% higher 19.01% 30.78%
P
O
L
A
N
D
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
IT
A
L
Y
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
positive negative positive negative
higher 21.44% 48.94% higher 10.69% 44.56%
lower 13.70% 15.92% lower 17.64% 27.11%
positive negative positive negative
lower 15.13% 35.80% lower 12.18% 38.33%
higher 19.26% 29.81% higher 16.12% 33.36%
H
U
N
G
A
R
Y
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
INTE/DEBT
S
L
O
V
A
K
IA
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
positive negative positive negative
higher 10.04% 41.55% higher 47.12% 9.78%
lower 19.66% 28.75% lower 29.89% 13.21%
positive negative positive negative
lower 14.00% 34.78% lower 49.79% 7.16%
higher 15.64% 35.58% higher 27.24% 15.81%
U
S
A
U
N
IT
E
D
 K
IN
G
D
O
M
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
INTE/DEBT
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
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Tables 5 to 7 present the rankings of the Countries based on three different indicators as stated above 
in sample and methodology description, i.e. Risk of Default, Missing Opportunities and Inefficient 
Debt Pricing. 
 
Table 5: Allocative rankings - Risk of Default 
 
 
 
Table 6: Allocative Rankings – Missing Opportunities 
 
 
Table 7: Allocative Rankings – Inefficient Debt Pricing 
 
Ranking Country
Risk of Default (II 
Quadrant)
1 USA 9.78%
2 Poland 38.98%
3 France 40.38%
4 UK 41.55%
5 Italy 41.81%
6 Germany 41.98%
7 Spain 43.11%
8 Slovakia 44.56%
9 Czech Republic 46.71%
10 Hungary 48.94%
LEVEL OF DEBT
Ranking Country
Expected 
GDP growth 
Missing 
Opportunities
1 Italy 0.95% 0.25%
2 Hungary 2.25% 0.36%
3 France 1.40% 0.41%
4 Germany 1.75% 0.46%
5 Czech Republic 2.55% 0.58%
6 Slovakia 2.85% 0.61%
7 UK 2.50% 0.61%
8 Spain 2.40% 0.65%
9 Poland 3.00% 0.75%
10 USA 3.15% 1.34%
LEVEL OF DEBT
Ranking Country
Inefficient Debt Pricig 
(II/II & III Quadrant)
1 USA 20.80%
2 France 63.73%
3 Hungary 65.02%
4 Poland 65.38%
5 Germany 66.66%
6 Italy 67.62%
7 Czech Republic 67.91%
8 Spain 68.55%
9 UK 68.99%
10 Slovakia 70.40%
PRICE OF DEBT
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According to Table 5: (i) US firms are strongly different from the others in our sample; (ii) all 
Countries where Basel regulation is fully applied deploys similar empirical evidence; (iii) the UK 
case seems nearer to the Continental Europe evidence, but this is direct consequence of the 
characteristics in data sample, as discussed later.  
Table 6 shows the value of Missing Opportunities as adjusted by the expected GDP growth of 
each Country; therefore, deploying the opportunity cost of missing such a growth. This tricky 
indicator contributes to the resulting evidence, as the Italian and USA case explain. The first position 
for Italian firms is driven by the low value of the GDP growth (0.95%), while good companies missing 
bank allowances are frequent (21.10%, Table 4). Conversely, the last position of USA is direct 
consequence of particularly high value of GDP growth and frequency of companies missing 
opportunities.  
Finally, Table 7 presents the Inefficient debt pricing classification. As for Risk of default 
allocation, US firms are strongly different than the other, while all Countries (Basel regulated) are 
more similar.  
 
We turn now to the second research question of the study, where we attempt at grading the efficacy 
of Basel regulation within the Countries under analysis. Table 8, helps us to classify each Country 
according to the two steps of efficiency as identified in the section describing the model of analysis 
(financing efficiency and capital allocation efficiency)6.  
 
Table 8: Adjusted R-squared of the test of efficiency of Financial System on a Country by Country basis 
 
 
Based on the panel regressions results, we find that Germany, only, presents a semi-strong form of 
efficiency. We notice that this is the only Country where regression (i) has the highest adjusted R-
squared (47%), if regressed on the Intensity of debt. Hence, we can say that, in Germany, financing 
decisions are related mainly to the current level of risks. In fact, when moving to regression (ii) for 
the weak and (iii) for the absence form of efficiency, R-squared decreases. At the second step of 
efficiency (i.e. Separation Theorem), Germany confirms efficiency. In fact, on one hand, financing 
CZECH REPUBLIC DEBT/OPRE ROI GERMANY DEBT/OPRE ROI
Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.1602 0.0332 Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.4672 0.0151
Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.1644 0.0751 Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.3743 0.0372
Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.7700 0.0655 Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.4021 0.0710
SPAIN DEBT/OPRE ROI FRANCE DEBT/OPRE ROI
Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.4928 -0.0007 Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.4865 -0.0004
Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.5605 0.0888 Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.9854 -0.0009
Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.5030 -0.0009 Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.5056 -0.0004
HUNGARY DEBT/OPRE ROI ITALY DEBT/OPRE ROI
Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.3128 0.0897 Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.4627 0.0366
Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.3523 0.5119 Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.5054 0.0435
Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.7622 0.4594 Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.7569 0.0536
POLAND DEBT/OPRE ROI SLOVAKIA DEBT/OPRE ROI
Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.2856 0.2335 Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.3138 0.3591
Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.4160 0.3734 Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.4426 0.3268
Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.8794 0.4991 Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.6830 0.3372
UK DEBT/OPRE ROI USA DEBT/OPRE ROI
Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.2283 0.0032 Semi-strong: Yi ,t = β0 + β1Xi ,t + εi ,t 0.3999 0.2150
Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.3942 0.0161 Weak: Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Xi,t-1 + εi,t 0.9417 0.2154
Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.3607 0.0659 Absence: Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t-1 + β2Xi,t + εi,t 0.7020 0.3680
IS BASEL THE RIGHT GATEWAY FOR A MORE EFFICIENT DEBT MARKET? AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON 
 
33 
decisions are strongly correlated with the mix of business risks and, on the other hand, the investment 
decisions are not correlated with risks. In this context, the management can take decisions in a risk 
neutral framework, since the appetite for risk of the financial system selects the investment 
worthiness.  
Out of the European aggregate, France and Spain are the second ranked countries according to 
both the first and second steps of efficiency. As far as the financing efficiency is concerned, we 
classify the two Countries as having a “weak form of efficiency.” If we compare the adjusted R-
squared in regression applied to Intensity of debt, the regression (ii) has the highest one (France: 99%; 
Spain: 56%). Hence, we can say that in these Countries financing decisions relate to both current and 
past risks. Additionally, in these two Countries, there is also capital allocation efficiency given that 
the separation between investment and financing decisions works.  
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, are the worst ones in terms of financing 
efficiency. In fact, the regression (iii) has the highest adjusted R-squared (Poland: 88%; Czech 
Republic: 77%; Hungary: 76%; Slovakia: 68%). This means that banks are not interested in present 
or past risks but they decide according to an incremental approach, by considering their past decisions, 
only. Additionally, the separation between investing and financing decisions is not present.  Both 
decisions are correlated with the mix of business risks.  
Italy is an intermediate and anomalous case: while there is no financing efficiency (the regression 
on the “absence of efficiency” has the highest R-squared equal to 76%), the separation of investing 
and financing decisions seems to work. In fact, investing decisions are neutral toward risks while 
financing relate strongly with past decisions.  
By looking at Anglo-Saxon Countries we find that, while both can be classified as having a weak 
form of efficiency, in UK the separation between investing and financing decisions seems to work, 
but not the same for USA. 
Discussing the empirical evidence 
The classification of financing efficiency, as reported in Table 8, let us run some cross-checks with 
results in Tables 5 to 7, i.e. with the rankings based on Risk of Default, Missing Opportunities and 
Inefficient Debt Pricing.  
Looking at the ranking based on “Risk of Default”, you may find clear relationships with the 
efficiency degree of each Country as defined in term of better debt allocating system. In fact, USA, 
France and UK are among the top five Countries in Table 5.  
By considering the “Missing Opportunities” indicator, the situation is slightly different. Some of 
the Countries with the worst situation in terms of Risk of Default, are on the top of the ranking stated 
in Table 6 and vice versa. However, we want to underline, as mentioned above, that the rankings are 
adjusted by the Expected GDP growth. It is important to understand that the first rank for Italy it is 
not due to a low value of missing opportunities, but it is due to the low value of the expected GDP 
growth. At the same time, the last position of USA is affected by the higher value of the expected 
GDP growth and not by the higher value of missing opportunities. 
Lastly, focusing on “Inefficient Debt Pricing” (Table 7), you find proof that some of the most 
efficient Countries have a better debt allocating system if compared to the less efficient ones. 
The only exception for any cross-check is the case of Germany, where you must also consider 
qualitative factors in the German practice of evaluating the firms’ merit of credit. In our model these 
kind of factors are not included, this is why we obtained results apparently contrasting: Germany is 
ranked as an intermediate Country in Risk of Default (Table 5), Missing Opportunities (Table 6) and 
Inefficient Debt Pricing (Table 7), while looking at the whole system, Germany presents a semi-
strong form of efficiency (Table 8). Future research will attempt at improving the Rating methodology 
for Germany by adding qualitative factors to narrow the gaps. 
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More discussions about the results from the intersection of the efficiency level of each Country (Table 
8) and the rankings (Tables from 5 to 7), it is important to control some specificities of the Anglo 
Saxon Countries (UK and USA) versus the European Countries. In fact, analyzing the data we 
observed that the UK and the USA have both a lower level of debt financing compared to the 
European aggregate. To confirm this observation, we perform a t-test of difference on the gross level 
of debt (Equation [5]) of three groups of Countries: USA, UK and Europe. 
Gross Debt − to − equity ratio = 𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵/𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 = 𝐺𝐹𝑃𝑡 𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐷𝑡⁄                                                               [5] 
This control is required since the financial systems of the Anglo-Saxon Countries (i.e. USA and 
UK, where Basel regulation is not fully applied) are more market-oriented than those of the other 
Countries (more banking-oriented). Accordingly, the use of equity in corporate financing is wider. 
Companies using more equity should have lower than level-1 debt-to-equity ratio. This is direct 
consequence of the expectation that Anglo-Saxon Countries may have more developed equity capital 
markets (e.g. private equity and stock listing). Equity may compete with banks in fund provisioning 
and, this way, being more disciplinant in controlling the corporate risk sharing inside the financial 
system than the Basel practices are. In fact, we should find out that the Anglo-Saxon Countries present 
a lower amount of debt financing and, at the same time, a bigger efficiency in its allocation, we will 
be able to grade more the true efficacy of Basel regulation.  
One issue with comparing sample means is the fact that the UK average value for the gross debt-
to-equity ratio (Equation [5]) is biased by few outliers. For this reason, we truncate the sample by 
eliminating 10% of the outer tails (5% of each side of the distribution, hence retaining 90% of the 
data). 
The hypothesis of the t-test is as follows:   {
𝐻0: 𝜇𝑖 ≤  𝜇𝑗
𝐻1: 𝜇𝑖 > 𝜇𝑗 ,
 
Where 𝜇 represents the gross level of debt to equity ratio (Table 9) in our sample. 
 
Table 9: t-test of difference on sample means-GDEB/EQUITY 
 
 
Table 9 confirms that both the US and the UK have lower bank debt financing practices as compared 
to Europe. This implies that these two Anglo-Saxon Countries have more developed capital markets 
(via private equity or public markets), which are key competitors to the banking system. This has key 
implications on the efficacy of Basel regulation, as we shall see from the results of our rankings. 
The empirical data  for both the UK and the US are classifiable as having a weak form of 
efficiency, given that the regression on these form of efficiency are the ones with the highest R 
squared (USA:94%, UK:39% Table 8). Differently, while the UK is also efficient from a capital 
allocation perspective, the USA is not, given that both investing and financing decisions are correlated 
with the mix of business risks. 
Sample
Sample mean 
(complete sample)
90% sample in the 
middle (quantiles)
EU 1.36 na
UK 8.93 0.95
USA -0.14 na
Compared 
samples t-stat
95% confidence 
interval p-value
UK vs USA 1.724243728 [-∞, 2.1363] 0.9577
UK vs EU -2.031546821 [-∞, -0.0771] 0.0211
USA vs EU -2.254599271 [-∞, -0.40502] 0.0121
Samples without "anoumalous" firms
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Given this evidences, we estimate the allocation matrices adjusted by debt-to-equity ratio for 
both USA and UK. (Table 10 and 11).  
 
Table 10: Allocative matrices adjusted by debt-to-equity ratio – USA 
 
 
Table 11: Allocative matrices adjusted by debt-to-equity ratio - UK 
 
 
 
Substituting these results in Table 5 we note that the USA and the UK rank in the first two positions 
of the “Risk of Default” (USA= 8%; UK =29%. Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Adjusted allocative rankings - Risk of Default 
 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that Anglo-Saxon Countries, where Basel regulation is not fully applied, 
present a more developed equity market and more efficiency in debt allocation. 
 
positive negative positive negative
higher 40.44% 8.32% higher 78.04% 16.55%
lower 35.91% 15.33% lower 2.03% 3.38%
positive negative positive negative
lower 45.76% 6.07% lower 77.99% 8.49%
higher 30.56% 17.62% higher 13.51% n.a.
D
E
B
/E
Q
U
IT
Y
>
1
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
D
E
B
/E
Q
U
IT
Y
<
1
Rating
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Rating
INTE/DEBT
positive negative positive negative
higher 7.88% 28.89% higher 15.12% 71.30%
lower 25.72% 37.51% lower 5.42% 8.16%
positive negative positive negative
lower 14.64% 31.23% lower 21.88% 64.01%
higher 18.54% 35.59% higher 14.11% n.a.
D
E
B
/E
Q
U
IT
Y
>
1
Rating
DEBT/OPRE
Rating
INTE/DEBT
D
E
B
/E
Q
U
IT
Y
<
1
Rating
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Rating
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Ranking Country
Risk of Default
(II Quadrant)
1 USA 8.32%
2 UK 28.89%
3 Poland 38.98%
4 France 40.38%
5 Italy 41.81%
6 Germany 41.98%
7 Spain 43.11%
8 Slovakia 44.56%
9 Czech Republic 46.71%
10 Hungary 48.94%
LEVEL OF DEBT
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Concluding remarks 
This paper aims to detect if the Basel regulation really contributes to the efficiency of the financial 
system, particularly the banking sector and the credit for small and medium size enterprises. By 
comparing empirical evidences in Anglo-Saxon Countries and Continental Europe ones, we give 
some insights, since the formers (USA, particularly) adopt the Basel framework less intensively, 
while the latters fully adopt it. 
While the Basel-adopting Countries strike-out more homogenous results, the USA case clearly 
diverts from standards and UK case gives no unique tendency because of sample composition. USA 
appears more efficient in allocating the bank allowances (i.e. data show lower risk of default and 
lower mispricing). Minor diversions are reported for missing opportunities, even if the more efficient 
US equity market may explain this evidence: high growth companies access equity financing. 
As final concluding remark, we can state that a stronger competition between debt and equity funding 
could contribute more than further banking regulation to achieve higher efficiency of the financial 
system. Benefits could be particularly strong for small and medium enterprises.  
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Appendix 
Table 1 - (extract from Mantovani and Castellan, 2015) 
Index Unit Formula derived from ORBIS Definition 
Technology features 
CA/FIASt % CUASt FIASt⁄  Current rate of assets 
CA/CLt % CUASt CULIt⁄  Current equilibrium 
WKCA/FIASt % WKCAt FIASt⁄  Relative intensity of working capital 
FIAS/OPREt % 
[(FIASt +  FIASt−1) / 2] 
OPREt
 Absolute intensity of fixed assets 
RLFAt -- 
[(FIASt +  FIASt−1) / 2] 
DEPRt
 Residual Life of Fixed Assets 
Financial strategy 
DEB/EBITDAt -- 
[(NFPt
∗ + NFPt−1
∗  ) / 2] 
EBTAt
 Years for debt re-financing 
DEBLTt % CUASt NFPt
∗⁄  Long term debt rate 
DEB/EQUITYt -- NFPt
∗ SHFDt⁄  Debt-to-equity ratio 
DEB/OPREt -- 
[(NFPt
∗ + NFPt−1
∗ ) / 2] 
OPREt
 Intensity of debt 
LEVt -- 
OPPLt  
OPPLt − INTEt
 Financial leverage 
INTE/DEBt % 
INTEt
[(NFPt
∗ + NFPt−1
∗ )/2]
 Financial interest rate 
Operating risks 
WKCA/OPREt % 
[(WKCAt +  WKCAt−1) / 2] 
OPREt
 Absolute intensity of working capital 
DOL
− volumet 
-- AVt OPPLt⁄  Degree of operative leverage on volume changes 
DOL − pricet -- [
MDCUt
∗∗∗
(MDCUt
∗∗∗–  x)
− 1] ∗ 100 Degree of op. lev. on price changes of x (x=1%) 
CRED − DEBTt dd 
(CREDt + CREDt−1)/2
MATEt/365
−
(DEBTt + DEBTt−1)/2
OPREt/365
 
Difference between delays on payments to 
creditors and payments from debtors 
Rate of return 
ROIt % 
OPPLt
[(CINt
∗∗∗ + CINt−1
∗∗∗ )/2]
 Return on Investment  
Adjusted ROIt % 
EBTAt − 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐾𝑡 + 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐾𝑡−1
[(CINt
∗∗∗∗ + CINt−1
∗∗∗∗)/2]
 
Alternative Return on Investment 
ROEt % 
PLt
[(SHFDt + SHFDt−1)/2]
 Return on Equity 
ROSt % OPPLt OPREt⁄  Return on Sales 
AV/STAFt % AVt STAFt⁄  Work productivity (cost of employees) 
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AV/EMPLt % AV/EMPLt Work productivity (number of employees) 
EBIT/INTt -- OPPLt INTEt⁄  Interest Coverage 
FCFC/OPREt % 
𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐴𝑡 + 𝑊𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝑊𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑡
𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡
 Margin of Free Cash Flow Characteristic  
FCFO/OPREt % 
FCFCt − (DEPRt + FIASt − FIASt−1)
OPREt
 Margin of Free Cash Flow Operative  
TAXt % TAXAt OPPLt⁄  Tax rate 
Self elaborated account values 
 
*NFPt € LOANt + LTDBt − CASHt  Net Financial Position 
**GFPt € LOANt + LTDBt Gross Financial Position 
***MDCUt % AVt OPREt⁄  Contribution Margin 
****CINt € FIASt + WKCAt Total Net Investments 
 
 
Tables 2 - Descriptive statistics for the final sample 
 
 
Italy Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation France Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
CA/FIASt 8.06 7.39 2.63 25.06 CA/FIASt 38.91 38.64 4.89 388.53
CA/CLt 1.69 1.71 1.23 37.31 CA/CLt 4.59 1.61 1.33 4962.96
WKCA/OPREt 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.33 WKCA/OPREt 0.24 0.19 0.11 9.63
WKCA/FIASt 2.97 2.86 0.80 11.71 WKCA/FIASt 9.41 9.13 0.85 111.71
CRED-DEBDt 130.03 127.78 77.64 189.88 CRED-DEBDt 34271.30 41925.00 189.48 700871.00
DEBLTt 0.24 0.26 0.00 2.68 DEBLTt 0.14 0.15 0.00 4.67
FCFC/OPREt 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.19 FCFC/OPREt 0.07 0.07 0.07 18.14
FCFO/OPREt 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.63 FCFO/OPREt 12.39 6.11 0.04 3951.62
LEVt 1.30 1.31 1.10 10.57 LEVt 1.06 1.05 1.01 2.08
DOLt (volume) 6.72 6.96 5.08 44.12 DOLt (volume) 9.55 8.82 4.77 312.38
DOLt (price) 4.97 4.74 3.46 12.34 DOLt (price) 2.97 3.12 2.10 5.31
FIAS/OPREt 0.51 0.49 0.20 1.37 FIAS/OPREt 1.90 1.29 0.09 76.72
INTE/DEBt -0.14 -0.11 0.04 2.53 INTE/DEBt -0.04 -0.05 0.00 7.36
DEB/OPREt 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.59 DEB/OPREt -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 26.91
DEB/EBITDAt 1.85 1.89 1.02 28.55 DEB/EBITDAt -1.77 -1.57 -0.58 65.71
DEB/EQUITYt 1.82 1.77 0.39 7.65 DEB/EQUITYt -0.53 -0.32 -0.28 93.10
ROEt 0.08 0.07 0.05 1.44 ROEt 0.21 0.20 0.16 3.69
ROIt 0.13 0.12 0.07 1.02 ROIt 0.25 0.25 0.13 24.28
Adjusted ROIt 0.21 0.20 0.14 1.54 Adjusted ROIt 0.30 0.31 0.20 26.89
EBIT/INTt 183.41 178.72 2.99 2354.44 EBIT/INTt 1842.79 2275.80 10.65 35075.90
ROSt 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.15 ROSt -0.02 0.01 0.04 9.80
TAXt 0.37 0.38 0.37 1.97 TAXt 0.16 0.16 0.22 5.98
AV/STAFt-1 1.59 1.55 1.39 5.56 AV/STAFt-1 2.05 2.24 1.19 20.22
AV/EMPLt 59.80 59.59 51.14 46.75 AV/EMPLt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
RLFAt 10.9729 10.732 6.32 19.2818 RLFAt 94.6566 85.999 6.26461 1327.06
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Spain Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Germany Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
CA/FIASt 6.62 7.08 1.13 34.64 CA/FIASt 16.44 13.27 1.25 178.71
CA/CLt 5.64 4.57 1.61 25.86 CA/CLt 34.27 32.16 1.84 722.22
WKCA/OPREt 0.77 0.63 0.25 6.50 WKCA/OPREt 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.40
WKCA/FIASt 3.51 3.75 0.46 25.97 WKCA/FIASt 4.95 4.09 0.30 72.96
CRED-DEBDt -7.09 -5.24 -15.49 143.18 CRED-DEBDt 1747.11 1476.60 20.73 43704.40
DEBLTt 0.51 0.53 0.63 12.23 DEBLTt 0.49 0.47 0.32 5.30
FCFC/OPREt 0.17 0.15 0.12 5.72 FCFC/OPREt 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.38
FCFO/OPREt -0.21 -0.17 0.05 8.64 FCFO/OPREt 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.71
LEVt 1.60 1.52 1.07 19.19 LEVt 1.36 1.33 1.09 10.51
DOLt (volume) 5.67 6.01 3.13 43.64 DOLt (volume) 8.99 9.98 4.16 163.37
DOLt (price) 3.93 4.38 2.78 18.05 DOLt (price) 3.99 3.90 2.67 75.48
FIAS/OPREt 5.22 3.93 0.47 22.19 FIAS/OPREt 7.17 3.13 0.27 726.14
INTE/DEBt -0.12 -0.07 0.04 9.38 INTE/DEBt -1.17 -1.20 0.04 17.09
DEB/OPREt 1.38 1.13 0.17 8.65 DEB/OPREt 0.47 0.36 0.03 4.89
DEB/EBITDAt 2.65 2.39 1.36 36.60 DEB/EBITDAt 1.21 1.03 0.33 14.22
DEB/EQUITYt 0.95 0.86 0.24 15.37 DEB/EQUITYt 0.67 0.57 0.06 9.78
ROEt 0.06 0.07 0.05 3.17 ROEt 0.17 0.16 0.06 2.62
ROIt 0.10 0.11 0.05 6.03 ROIt 0.16 0.14 0.08 5.51
Adjusted ROIt 0.12 0.13 0.09 5.43 Adjusted ROIt 0.28 0.27 0.15 5.00
EBIT/INTt 24.58 24.85 2.61 109.08 EBIT/INTt 1420.66 1281.60 3.71 65250.60
ROSt 0.04 0.04 0.05 5.95 ROSt 0.05 0.06 0.05 2.61
TAXt 0.14 0.10 0.21 9.36 TAXt 0.20 0.19 0.15 5.04
AV/STAFt-1 3.79 3.50 1.55 14.82 AV/STAFt-1 4.99 3.12 1.36 134.27
AV/EMPLt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. AV/EMPLt 110.21 95.62 68.65 225.88
RLFAt 35.199 30.436 12.148 73.5458 RLFAt 74.069 52.111 8.53863 1450.34
Poland Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Czech Republic Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
CA/FIASt 8.04 5.89 1.50 31.62 CA/FIASt 8.84 8.20 1.56 53.59
CA/CLt 2.46 2.27 1.57 3.07 CA/CLt 2.92 2.84 1.74 4.12
WKCA/OPREt 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.16 WKCA/OPREt 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.59
WKCA/FIASt 2.79 2.07 0.52 13.32 WKCA/FIASt 1.85 1.80 0.38 9.70
CRED-DEBDt 489.13 464.54 41.37 1810.57 CRED-DEBDt 291.90 300.98 13.02 2385.10
DEBLTt 0.24 0.23 0.00 1.22 DEBLTt 0.16 0.16 0.00 7.31
FCFC/OPREt 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.13 FCFC/OPREt 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.22
FCFO/OPREt 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.26 FCFO/OPREt 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.43
LEVt 1.16 1.16 1.04 1.24 LEVt 1.18 1.18 1.05 1.75
DOLt (volume) 6.49 7.04 3.51 50.87 DOLt (volume) 6.70 6.59 4.22 28.57
DOLt (price) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. DOLt (price) 4.22 4.47 2.98 7.90
FIAS/OPREt 0.59 0.66 0.20 1.12 FIAS/OPREt 0.72 0.63 0.22 3.06
INTE/DEBt -0.25 -0.29 0.00 15.80 INTE/DEBt 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.90
DEB/OPREt 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.27 DEB/OPREt 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.86
DEB/EBITDAt 0.10 0.06 -0.04 8.85 DEB/EBITDAt -0.26 -0.16 -0.23 16.15
DEB/EQUITYt 0.05 0.05 -0.03 1.17 DEB/EQUITYt 0.03 0.06 -0.07 2.69
ROEt 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.63 ROEt 0.17 0.15 0.09 5.88
ROIt 0.25 0.21 0.12 0.80 ROIt 0.35 0.32 0.11 4.91
Adjusted ROIt 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.96 Adjusted ROIt 0.45 0.42 0.19 5.01
EBIT/INTt 172.61 184.94 10.08 763.80 EBIT/INTt 103.97 116.48 6.52 1149.30
ROSt 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.10 ROSt 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.16
TAXt 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.49 TAXt 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.27
AV/STAFt-1 2.17 2.21 1.52 3.25 AV/STAFt-1 1.71 1.71 1.38 2.91
AV/EMPLt 27047.90 26523.00 19851.40 24765.70 AV/EMPLt 21.60 22.58 16.90 17.91
RLFAt 46.182 50.543 7.24761 204.238 RLFAt 19.954 17.913 7.4422 112.91
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Hungary Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Slovakia Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
CA/FIASt 4.55 32.16 1.17 24.36 CA/FIASt 4.25 4.00 1.08 9.64
CA/CLt 1.92 2.36 1.32 2.34 CA/CLt 1.76 1.75 1.28 1.62
WKCA/OPREt 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.14 WKCA/OPREt 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.51
WKCA/FIASt 1.20 6.92 0.40 4.19 WKCA/FIASt 1.16 1.14 0.36 3.53
CRED-DEBDt 355.04 3938.40 26.17 2070.80 CRED-DEBDt 941.33 842.07 53.20 4473.58
DEBLTt 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.68 DEBLTt 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.67
FCFC/OPREt 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.12 FCFC/OPREt 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.49
FCFO/OPREt 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.18 FCFO/OPREt 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.77
LEVt 1.28 1.20 1.09 2.87 LEVt 1.23 1.23 1.06 1.22
DOLt (volume) 7.34 19.68 3.96 62.67 DOLt (volume) 6.46 6.50 3.46 30.06
DOLt (price) 5.18 4.13 3.66 11.23 DOLt (price) 4.69 4.61 3.33 7.66
FIAS/OPREt 0.44 0.90 0.29 0.56 FIAS/OPREt 1.05 1.02 0.35 4.44
INTE/DEBt -0.17 -2.05 0.05 2.82 INTE/DEBt -0.14 3508.60 0.02 3.12
DEB/OPREt -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.20 DEB/OPREt 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 0.62
DEB/EBITDAt -0.19 0.65 -0.25 7.39 DEB/EBITDAt -0.13 0.03 -0.07 11.98
DEB/EQUITYt -0.07 0.13 -0.08 1.12 DEB/EQUITYt 0.14 -0.04 -0.02 2.16
ROEt 0.18 0.93 0.11 1.11 ROEt 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.64
ROIt 0.14 0.24 0.09 0.54 ROIt 0.17 0.15 0.08 1.00
Adjusted ROIt 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.59 Adjusted ROIt 0.31 0.15 0.20 1.70
EBIT/INTt 268.35 292.38 4.44 5633.74 EBIT/INTt 168.73 0.29 6.11 6013.07
ROSt 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.10 ROSt 0.05 203.52 0.05 0.35
TAXt 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.34 TAXt 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.25
AV/STAFt-1 2.17 19.50 1.58 5.29 AV/STAFt-1 2.67 0.14 1.54 8.14
AV/EMPLt 22588.00 31543.00 16086.50 26255.90 AV/EMPLt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
RLFAt 11.0551 47.735 7.36826 55.2886 RLFAt 10.0654 2.6924 5.8829 21.6425
UK Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation USA Mean
Weighted 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
CA/FIASt 73.16 61.73 2.45 902.54 CA/FIASt 3.47 2.85 0.88 9.67
CA/CLt 7.05 6.77 1.31 157.89 CA/CLt 2.97 2.90 1.82 8.18
WKCA/OPREt 0.20 0.19 0.08 1.39 WKCA/OPREt 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.22
WKCA/FIASt 11.92 10.25 0.29 276.70 WKCA/FIASt 1.18 0.98 0.28 3.53
CRED-DEBDt 61.61 62.38 42.47 86.97 CRED-DEBDt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
DEBLTt 0.39 0.39 0.03 2.99 DEBLTt 0.50 0.55 0.00 2.54
FCFC/OPREt 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.86 FCFC/OPREt -0.03 0.03 0.11 1.07
FCFO/OPREt 0.05 0.06 0.05 1.55 FCFO/OPREt -0.19 -0.12 0.02 1.24
LEVt 0.79 0.88 1.02 40.49 LEVt 1.07 1.11 1.01 1.74
DOLt (volume) 5.21 5.42 3.36 68.01 DOLt (volume) 1.86 2.14 1.18 6.08
DOLt (price) 4.15 4.09 2.62 14.65 DOLt (price) 3.86 4.77 2.33 32.00
FIAS/OPREt 2.92 2.72 0.16 38.68 FIAS/OPREt 1.72 1.58 0.49 6.92
INTE/DEBt 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.96 INTE/DEBt -0.33 -0.11 0.05 7.44
DEB/OPREt 1.72 1.57 0.15 10.19 DEB/OPREt -0.04 0.00 0.05 9.24
DEB/EBITDAt 2.36 2.35 0.91 33.26 DEB/EBITDAt 0.79 0.93 0.53 16.11
DEB/EQUITYt 4.04 4.84 0.18 606.54 DEB/EQUITYt 0.11 0.17 0.01 12.32
ROEt 0.84 0.47 0.11 89.47 ROEt 0.14 0.09 0.08 8.61
ROIt 0.16 0.16 0.08 19.34 ROIt 0.06 0.06 0.07 1.11
Adjusted ROIt 0.37 0.34 0.17 10.42 Adjusted ROIt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
EBIT/INTt 131.51 124.51 3.07 1653.19 EBIT/INTt -2.30 17.63 2.27 404.07
ROSt 0.01 0.02 0.05 2.54 ROSt -1.85 -0.82 0.04 27.79
TAXt 0.18 0.18 0.22 1.82 TAXt 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.59
AV/STAFt-1 1.86 1.85 1.30 6.38 AV/STAFt-1 6.13 10.17 1.34 46.88
AV/EMPLt 86474.70 87789.00 54900.80 200312.00 AV/EMPLt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
RLFAt 103.085 91.619 6.62797 820.71 RLFAt 20.364 17.986 10.5891 71.3343
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Table 3 - Results of the test of efficiency of Financial System on a Country by Country basis 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.1924 *** 0.0169 * 0.1842 *** -0.0210 0.1847 *** -0.0208 ***
(0.0000) (0.0412) (0.0000) (0.0606) (0.0000) (0.0078)
CA/FIASt 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 * 0.0000 0.0004 *** 0.0000
(0.1267) (0.9530) (0.0519) (0.7052) (0.0006) (0.6414)
CA/FIASt-1 -0.0001
(0.7796)
CA/CLt 0.0021 0.0044 *** 0.0050 0.0061 ** 0.0040 0.0096 ***
(0.3649) (0.0002) (0.1752) (0.0010) (0.2351) (0.0000)
CA/CLt-1 -0.0029
(0.3254)
WKCA/OPREt -0.1305 *** 0.1213 *** -0.2008 ** 0.7697 *** -0.1806 *** 0.3970 ***
(0.0042) (0.0000) (0.0137) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt-1 0.0490
(0.5117)
WKCA/FIASt -0.1305 ** -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0005 *
(0.0437) (0.1783) (0.2527) (0.1413) (0.7217) (0.0557)
WKCA/FIASt-1 -0.0007
(0.4152)
CRED-DEBDt -0.0002 0.0014 *** -0.0001 0.0020 *** -0.0002 0.0015 ***
(0.5897) (0.0000) (0.9203) (0.0000) (0.6552) (0.0000)
CRED-DEBDt-1 -0.0004
(0.7750)
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt 0.0268 * -0.0491 *** 0.0083 0.0568 *** 0.0045 0.0532 ***
(0.0667) (0.0000) (0.7275) (0.0000) (0.8254) (0.0000)
FCFO/OPREt-1 0.0026
(0.8757)
LEVt -0.0011 0.0033 -0.0007 0.0033 -0.0010 0.0018
(0.7754) (0.1012) (0.8736) (0.1443) (0.8236) (0.3145)
LEVt-1 -0.0014
(0.7566)
DOLt (volume) 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9832) (0.4652) (0.9943) (0.6563) (0.9998) (0.8354)
DOLt-1 (volume) -0.0001
(0.6293)
DOLt (price) 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0008
(0.9626) (0.8369) (0.9642) (0.3087) (0.7434) (0.1088)
DOLt-1 (price) 0.0001
(0.9342)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0065 ** 0.1112 *** -0.0035 0.1270 *** -0.0030 0.0472 ***
(0.0457) (0.0000) (0.5668) (0.0000) (0.4263) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 0.0002
(0.9676)
INT/DEBt -0.0006 0.0015 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.8640) (0.4178) (0.9974) (0.8649) (0.9618) (0.8522)
INT/DEBt-1 -0.0009
(0.8382)
DEB/OPREt -0.0032 0.0072 0.0016
(0.7170) (0.5840) (0.8686)
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0074 0.5249 ***
(0.6340) (0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
(0.4775) (0.8923) (0.8915)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 0.0003
(0.2601)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0001 0.0026 ** 0.0004
(0.8010) (0.0354) (0.4845)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 -0.0010
(0.3607)
ROEt -0.0030 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0027 0.0003
(0.1979) (0.5599) (0.6419) (0.8811) (0.2947) (0.7434)
ROEt-1 0.0007
(0.7773)
ROIt -0.0006 0.0012
(0.7852) (0.5420)
ROIt-1 0.0588 ***
(0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt
Adjusted ROIt-1
EBIT/INTt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0673) (0.7006) (0.1993) (0.0548) (0.1209) (0.5063)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000
(0.7504)
ROSt 0.2128 -0.3949 *** 0.1677 *** -0.7068 *** 0.1857 *** -0.7152 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROSt-1 0.0242
(0.5888)
TAXt 0.0340 -0.0197 0.0299 -0.0063 0.0302 -0.0247 **
(0.1145) (0.0691) (0.2754) (0.6484) (0.2530) (0.0222)
TAXt-1 -0.0207
(0.4009)
AV/STAFt 0.0004 *** 0.0000
(0.0010) (0.8749)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0001
(0.8291)
AV/EMPLt -0.0001 0.0002
(0.7567) (0.1550)
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt -0.0001 -0.0002 *** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 ***
(0.1354) (0.0000) (0.8993) (0.5147) (0.0000)
RFLAt-1 0.0000
(0.8550)
R-squared 0.0019 0.1872 0.0017 0.1796 0.0056 0.4416
Adj. R-squared 0.0019 0.1871 0.0017 0.1795 0.0056 0.4414
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Semi-strong Weak Absence
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GERMANY
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.1176 *** -0.1176 *** 0.1069 *** -0.0998 *** 0.0819 *** -0.0332 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt 0.0006 *** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.1767) (0.4666) (0.2936) (0.4077) (0.7302)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0000
(0.7236)
CA/CLt 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *
(0.5862) (0.0000) (0.7605) (0.0000) (0.6138) (0.0283)
CA/CLt-1 0.0000 ***
(0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt -0.2229 ** 0.5730 *** -0.2383 * 0.0879 ***
(0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0157) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt-1 -0.1885 * 0.6539 ***
(0.0313) (0.0000)
WKCA/FIASt -0.0004 0.0000 0.0008 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000
(0.2896) (0.9817) (0.3157) (0.6565) (0.5199) (0.4209)
WKCA/FIASt-1 -0.0003 0.0000
(0.6255) (0.9937)
CRED-DEBDt 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9760) (0.1792) (0.9699) (0.4442) (0.9759) (0.4483)
CRED-DEBDt-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9675) (0.9258)
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt -0.0078 0.0174 * -0.0094 0.0952 *** -0.0257 -0.0130 *
(0.7702) (0.0177) (0.7883) (0.0000) (0.5198) (0.0119)
FCFO/OPREt-1 0.0135 0.0300 ***
(0.6383) (0.0004)
LEVt -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.9478) (0.3973) (0.9309) (0.8121) (0.8312) (0.3565)
LEVt-1 -0.0007 0.0003
(0.4485) (0.3024)
DOLt (volume) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.7216) (0.2382) (0.8307) (0.4108) (0.8625) (0.8151)
DOLt-1 (volume) 0.0000 0.0000 *
(0.9730) (0.0321)
DOLt (price) 0.0027 *** 0.0001 0.0039 *** 0.0002 0.0024 *** 0.0002 *
(0.0000) (0.3959) (0.0000) (0.3067) (0.0001) (0.0365)
DOLt-1 (price) -0.0003 0.0000
(0.6026) (0.8500)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0067 0.3431 *** 0.0072 0.3268 *** 0.0119 0.0659 ***
(0.5708) (0.0000) (0.5362) (0.0000) (0.3378) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1
INT/DEBt -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0000
(0.1833) (0.1101) (0.6735) (0.4169) (0.1873) (0.7519)
INT/DEBt-1 -0.0007 * 0.0001
(0.0294) (0.2593)
DEB/OPREt 0.0084 0.0104
(0.7098) (0.6638)
DEB/OPREt-1 0.0064 0.8634 ***
(0.7853) (0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.4363) (0.4357) (0.4849)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 -0.0003
(0.3934)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.4579) (0.7401) (0.5024)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 -0.0001
(0.8141)
ROEt 0.0170 *** 0.0009 0.0115 ** 0.0001 0.0143 *** -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.3421) (0.0052) (0.9436) (0.0002) (0.6961)
ROEt-1 0.0082 *
(0.0375)
ROIt
ROIt-1 0.2160 ***
(0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0002
(0.6343) (0.7566) (0.7909)
Adjusted ROIt-1 -0.0005
(0.7591)
EBIT/INTt 0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0001 *** 0.0000 * 0.0001 *** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0707) (0.0000) (0.0327) (0.0000) (0.6109)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 **
(0.0015)
ROSt 1.1401 *** -0.1654 *** 1.2935 *** -0.1573 *** 1.0512 *** 0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9559)
ROSt-1 -0.2316 * -0.1465 ***
(0.0233) (0.0000)
TAXt 0.0012 -0.0016 0.0001 -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.8258) (0.2806) (0.9768) (0.3368) (0.9953) (0.7394)
TAXt-1 -0.0020 -0.0009
(0.6817) (0.5241)
AV/STAFt 0.0003 *** -0.0001 0.0003 *** -0.0002 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.7696) (0.0009) (0.3086) (0.1252)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0002 0.0000
(0.6065) (0.7509)
AV/EMPLt -0.0002
(0.2690)
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000
(0.6806) (0.0002) (0.8005) (0.0158) (0.6870) (0.5143)
RFLAt-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9517) (0.0986)
R-squared 0.0225 0.4871 0.0255 0.4785 0.0752 0.8900
Adj. R-squared 0.0224 0.4868 0.0254 0.4777 0.0752 0.8892
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Semi-strong Weak Absence
IS BASEL THE RIGHT GATEWAY FOR A MORE EFFICIENT DEBT MARKET? AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON 
 
43 
 
SPAIN
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.0875 *** 0.0559 *** 0.0761 *** -0.0051 0.0425 *** -0.0225
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.7569) (0.0000) (0.0853)
CA/FIASt 0.0004 *** -0.0004
(0.0000) (0.3600)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0005 ***
(0.0000)
CA/CLt 0.0000 -0.0115 *** 0.0001 -0.0088 *** -0.0001 -0.0064 ***
(0.8428) (0.0000) (0.5032) (0.0000) (0.6391) (0.0000)
CA/CLt-1 -0.0004 ** -0.0051 ***
(0.0022) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt 0.0040 *** 0.3493 *** 0.0087 *** 0.3960 *** 0.0025 ** 0.2940 ***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0054) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt-1 -0.0231 ***
(0.0003)
WKCA/FIASt 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0006
(0.0585) (0.4847) (0.3286) (0.2637)
WKCA/FIASt-1 0.0002
(0.7521)
CRED-DEBDt 0.0000 0.0002 ** 0.0000 0.0004 ** 0.0000 0.0004 ***
(0.5166) (0.0095) (0.2431) (0.0030) (0.5739) (0.0000)
CRED-DEBDt-1 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.6512) (0.1875)
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt -0.0006
(0.4804)
FCFO/OPREt-1
LEVt -0.0003 * 0.0036 *** -0.0003 0.0023 * -0.0002 0.0011
(0.0490) (0.0006) (0.0924) (0.0129) (0.2118) (0.1931)
LEVt-1 -0.0002 0.0023 *
(0.2662) (0.0218)
DOLt (volume) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.4640) (0.9056) (0.5793) (0.4559) (0.6376) (0.8981)
DOLt-1 (volume) 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.9251) (0.6311)
DOLt (price) -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0011 *** -0.0004 -0.0008 *** -0.0017
(0.6981) (0.1702) (0.0000) (0.7749) (0.0001) (0.1238)
DOLt-1 (price) 0.0002 0.0000
(0.3623) (0.9766)
FIAS/OPREt -0.0051 *** 0.2313 *** -0.0056 *** 0.1361 *** -0.0033 *** 0.1014 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 -0.0001 0.1245 ***
(0.9240) (0.0000)
INT/DEBt 0.0003 0.0015 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 0.0005
(0.6237) (0.6934) (0.4836) (0.8830) (0.5918) (0.8861)
INT/DEBt-1 0.0002 0.0023
(0.7252) (0.4948)
DEB/OPREt -0.0031 ** -0.0072 *** -0.0010
(0.0059) (0.0006) (0.3360)
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0013 0.5589 ***
(0.5772) (0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt -0.0001 * 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0417) (0.8928) (0.4661)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 0.0000
(0.5322)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0019 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0010 **
(0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0013)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 -0.0009 *
(0.0106)
ROEt 0.0564 *** -0.0335 0.0423 *** -0.0427 ** 0.0379 *** 0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0582) (0.0000) (0.0066) (0.0000) (0.9635)
ROEt-1 0.0366 *** -0.0243
(0.0000) (0.1628)
ROIt -0.0856
(0.2792)
ROIt-1 -0.1941 * 0.4561 ***
(0.0150) (0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt -0.0577 -0.1295 *** -0.0763 *
(0.3939) (0.0009) (0.0166)
Adjusted ROIt-1 0.0529
(0.3977)
EBIT/INTt 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0060) (0.1367) (0.0529) (0.1441) (0.1413) (0.4777)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0877) (0.2912)
ROSt 0.3109 *** -0.0840 0.3551 *** 0.9181 *** 0.2146 *** -0.0035
(0.0000) (0.1464) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9420)
ROSt-1 0.0971 *** -0.4507 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
TAXt 0.0018 -0.0023 0.0019 0.0233 ** 0.0006 0.0019
(0.1410) (0.7552) (0.1493) (0.0010) (0.5904) (0.7585)
TAXt-1 0.0023 -0.0265 ***
(0.0821) (0.0003)
AV/STAFt 0.0002 0.0081 *** 0.0019 *** -0.0087 *** 0.0004 0.0016
(0.5377) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.2013) (0.3063)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0023 *** 0.0199 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
AV/EMPLt
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt 0.0000 -0.0001 *** 0.0000 -0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0000 **
(0.6059) (0.0000) (0.9838) (0.0000) (0.7773) (0.0056)
RFLAt-1 0.0000 -0.0001 ***
(0.8061) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.0831 0.4490 0.1303 0.5130 0.2689 0.6938
Adj. R-squared 0.0830 0.4486 0.1300 0.5119 0.2686 0.6931
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Semi-strong Weak Absence
ACRN Oxford Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives 
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FRANCE
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.1741 *** 0.1528 *** 0.1641 *** 0.0830 *** 0.1521 *** 0.3212 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.1765) (0.3932) (0.8675) (0.9457) (0.2080) (0.8730)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0000 -0.0002 ***
(0.6846) (0.0001)
CA/CLt 0.0055 * -0.0555 *** 0.0059 -0.0546 *** 0.0040 -0.0357 ***
(0.0470) (0.0000) (0.1034) (0.0000) (0.1323) (0.0000)
CA/CLt-1 0.0035 -0.0243 ***
(0.3087) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt 0.1649 *** 6.5399 *** 0.0077 1.3420 *** 0.0067 1.5214 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8327) (0.0000) (0.8195) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt-1 -0.0284 -0.3482 ***
(0.4894) (0.0000)
WKCA/FIASt 0.0001 -0.0002 * 0.0000 -0.0002 *** 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.1657) (0.0500) (0.7042) (0.0032) (0.2073) (0.1853)
WKCA/FIASt-1 0.0001 -0.0008 ***
(0.5541) (0.0000)
CRED-DEBDt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.7459) (0.5536) (0.6151) (0.5996) (0.8913) (0.6822)
CRED-DEBDt-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.6754) (0.8607)
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt 0.1440 *** 5.2178 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt -0.0193 -2.6485 *** 0.0295 *** -0.0262 *** 0.0273 *** 0.0511 ***
(0.0874) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000)
FCFO/OPREt-1
LEVt 0.0011 -0.0078 0.0005 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0042
(0.7952) (0.1547) (0.902) (0.9981) (0.8803) (0.3414)
LEVt-1 0.0022 -0.0016
(0.6008) (0.5882)
DOLt (volume) 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 *
(0.9611) (0.1398) (0.9448) (0.1733) (0.8965) (0.0448)
DOLt-1 (volume) -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.2783) (0.2668)
DOLt (price) -0.0020 -0.0083 *** -0.0026 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0126 ***
(0.2407) (0.0003) (0.1612) (0.1380) (0.3688) (0.0000)
DOLt-1 (price) 0.0004 -0.0015
(0.8333) (0.2686)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0052 *** -0.8748 *** 0.0014 -1.0057 *** 0.0015 -0.9810 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1813) (0.0000) (0.1374) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 0.0008 0.8208 ***
(0.8941) (0.0000)
INT/DEBt 0.0031 -0.0006 0.0014 0.0004 0.0010 0.0013
(0.4429) (0.9069) (0.7396) (0.9038) (0.8107) (0.7762)
INT/DEBt-1 0.0051 0.0019
(0.216) (0.5051)
DEB/OPREt 0.0222 ***
(0.0000)
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0304 ** -0.0083 ***
(0.029) (0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.3601) (0.3466) (0.3514)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 0.0000
(0.9688)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.1687) (0.9661) (0.9563)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 0.0008
(0.6208)
ROEt 0.0094 -0.0008 0.0160 *** -0.0019 0.0102 0.0006
(0.0625) (0.8991) (0.0022) (0.6127) (0.0505) (0.9096)
ROEt-1 -0.0069
(0.0491) **
ROIt -0.0259 *** -0.0094
(0.0000) (0.0554)
ROIt-1 0.1267 ***
(0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt -0.0032
(0.3006)
Adjusted ROIt-1
EBIT/INTt 0.0000 * 0.0000 ** 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 *
(0.0244) (0.0014) (0.0865) (0.0777) (0.1056) (0.0101)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 * 0.0000
(0.0881) (0.3304)
ROSt
ROSt-1 0.0650 *** 0.4402
(0.0003) <
TAXt 0.0076 -0.0085 0.0075 -0.0078 0.0069 -0.0164 *
(0.2417) (0.3209) (0.2377) (0.0846) (0.2816) (0.0168)
TAXt-1 0.0116 * -0.0093
(0.0861) (0.0507)
AV/STAFt 0.0005 0.0011 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0020 ***
(0.3627) (0.1507) (0.5016) (0.4068) (0.3901) (0.0008)
AV/STAFt-1 0.0000 0.0009
(0.9525) (0.1104)
AV/EMPLt
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt 0.0000 0.0004 *** 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 ***
(0.4960) (0.0000) (0.8202) < (0.7720) (0.0000)
RFLAt-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9852) (0.9922)
R-squared 0.0015 0.9442 0.0023 0.9898 0.0195 0.9727
Adj. R-squared 0.0015 0.9439 0.0023 0.9890 0.0195 0.9723
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Semi-strong Weak Absence
IS BASEL THE RIGHT GATEWAY FOR A MORE EFFICIENT DEBT MARKET? AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON 
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HUNGARY
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.0954 *** -0.0057 0.0929 *** 0.0563 *** 0.0831 *** -0.0058
(0.0000) (0.4814) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4081)
CA/FIASt 0.0010 -0.0028 *** 0.0006 -0.0020 ***
(0.0574) (0.0000) (0.2942) (0.0002)
CA/FIASt-1 -0.0025 ** -0.0015
(0.0047) (0.0578)
CA/CLt 0.0033 -0.0086 *** 0.0078 -0.0139 ** 0.0026 -0.0003
(0.1090) (0.0000) (0.1353) (0.0034) (0.4185) (0.8511)
CA/CLt-1 -0.0044 -0.0264 ***
(0.4444) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt -0.0901 * 0.3261 *** -0.0940 * 0.1173 ***
(0.0254) (0.0000) (0.0424) (0.0002)
WKCA/OPREt-1
WKCA/FIASt 0.0041 * 0.0063 *** 0.0029 0.0014 0.0015 0.0041 **
(0.0140) (0.0000) (0.3188) (0.5892) (0.4117) (0.0073)
WKCA/FIASt-1 0.0073 * 0.0064
(0.0457) (0.0522)
CRED-DEBDt -0.0005 0.0042 *** -0.0022 *** 0.0000 -0.0031 *** 0.0040 ***
(0.0660) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.9877) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CRED-DEBDt-1
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt -0.0156 0.1649 *** 0.0068 -0.0659 *** -0.0264 0.0410 **
(0.3127) (0.0000) (0.6346) (0.0000) (0.1773) (0.0024)
FCFO/OPREt-1 0.0195 0.0972 ***
(0.1239) (0.0000)
LEVt -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0005
(0.8347) (0.2718) (0.7821) (0.2176) (0.8812) (0.4981)
LEVt-1 -0.0006 0.0015
(0.5502) (0.0963)
DOLt (volume) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 * -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.3458) (0.1617) (0.5476) (0.0300) (0.3502) (0.5245)
DOLt-1 (volume) -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.5878) (0.0864)
DOLt (price) -0.0003 0.0009 * -0.0002 0.0019 *** 0.0000 0.0005
(0.5577) (0.0241) (0.7537) (0.0009) (0.9596) (0.1069)
DOLt-1 (price) 0.0000 0.0002
(0.9978) (0.5349)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0074 0.1788 *** -0.0148 0.2807 *** 0.0083 0.0847 ***
(0.1372) (0.0000) (0.0622) (0.0000) (0.0822) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1
INT/DEBt -0.0001 0.0013 * -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0005
(0.8644) (0.0227) (0.8580) (0.3595) (0.7128) (0.2663)
INT/DEBt-1 0.0000 0.0008
(0.9878) (0.2262)
DEB/OPREt -0.0241 0.0077 -0.0199
(0.0786) (0.7510) (0.1532)
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0165 0.5495 ***
(0.5226) (0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.8395) (0.8021) (0.7693)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 -0.0001
(0.8263)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0030 -0.0127 *** -0.0024
(0.1212) (0.0003) (0.1998)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 0.0003
(0.9344)
ROEt 0.0812 *** 0.0010 0.0775 *** 0.0007 0.0729 *** 0.0046
(0.0000) (0.8347) (0.0000) (0.8924) (0.0000) (0.2494)
ROEt-1 0.0085 0.0040
(0.2192) (0.5192)
ROIt -0.0050 -0.0041 -0.0054
(0.7473) (0.8079) (0.6894)
ROIt-1 0.0233 0.0907 ***
(0.1843) (0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt -0.0131 -0.0224 -0.0139
(0.3329) (0.1852) (0.2820)
Adjusted ROIt-1 -0.0305 *
(0.0461)
EBIT/INTt 0.0001 *** 0.0000 * 0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0001 *** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0178) (0.0000) (0.2743) (0.0000) (0.2436)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 * 0.0000
(0.0332) (0.6610)
ROSt 0.5612 *** 0.0213 0.4360 *** 0.1299 ** 0.4693 *** -0.0138
(0.0000) (0.5544) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.6671)
ROSt-1 0.1625 * -0.3942 ***
(0.0100) (0.0000)
TAXt 0.0047 -0.0067 0.0059 0.0017 0.0061 -0.0081
(0.6217) (0.3862) (0.5892) (0.8666) (0.5804) (0.1850)
TAXt-1 0.0021 0.0035
(0.7979) (0.6292)
AV/STAFt -0.0001 0.0014 *** -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 ***
(0.2356) (0.0000) (0.8458) (0.7928) (0.5556) (0.0000)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0001 0.0019 ***
(0.6232) (0.0000)
AV/EMPLt
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt -0.0003 0.0019 *** -0.0004 0.0003
(0.1581) (0.0000) (0.1021) (0.1173)
RFLAt-1 0.0001 -0.0012 ***
(0.7548) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.0541 0.3924 0.0878 0.3922 0.0768 0.6300
Adj. R-squared 0.0540 0.3915 0.0873 0.3900 0.0765 0.6283
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Semi-strong Weak Absence
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ITALY
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.1088 *** 0.2057 *** 0.0964 *** 0.2389 *** 0.0699 *** 0.0629 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt 0.0000 0.0001 ** 0.0000 0.0002 *** 0.0000 0.0001 **
(0.1692) (0.0014) (0.8449) (0.0000) (0.1810) (0.0097)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0002 *** 0.0001 *
(0.0000) (0.0216)
CA/CLt 0.0146 *** -0.0965 *** 0.0134 *** -0.0682 *** 0.0110 *** -0.0367 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CA/CLt-1 0.0016 -0.0590 ***
(0.4936) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt
WKCA/OPREt-1
WKCA/FIASt 0.0000 -0.0004 *** -0.0002 -0.0009 *** 0.0001 -0.0006 ***
(0.6345) (0.0000) (0.2886) (0.0000) (0.5589) (0.0000)
WKCA/FIASt-1
CRED-DEBDt 0.0000 0.0003 *** 0.0000 0.0004 *** 0.0000 0.0002 ***
(0.8822) (0.0000) (0.5022) (0.0000) (0.8191) (0.0000)
CRED-DEBDt-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.7545) (0.2003)
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt 0.0099  *** -0.1803 *** 0.0110 *** -0.1832 *** 0.0084 *** -0.1005 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FCFO/OPREt-1 0.0012 -0.0031
(0.6684) (0.2533)
LEVt -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.5683) (0.1764) (0.7472) (0.5102) (0.7916) (0.5925)
LEVt-1 0.0000 0.0001
(0.9063) (0.8273)
DOLt (volume) -0.0001 * 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0287) (0.1093) (0.0699) (0.5041) (0.1569) (0.5490)
DOLt-1 (volume) -0.0001 0.0001 *
(0.1136) (0.0259)
DOLt (price) -0.0010 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0007 ** -0.0008 ** -0.0006 * -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0047) (0.0022) (0.0124) (0.1579)
DOLt-1 (price) -0.0005 -0.0008 **
(0.1015) (0.0066)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0078 *** 0.1815 *** 0.0201 *** 0.1051 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0505 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 -0.0117 *** 0.0942 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
INT/DEBt 0.0005 0.0027 *** 0.0005 0.0022 *** 0.0005 0.0012 ***
(0.0883) (0.0000) (0.1303) (0.0000) (0.1030) (0.0000)
INT/DEBt-1 0.0001 0.0013 ***
(0.8071) (0.0002)
DEB/OPREt -0.0153 *** 0.0194 *** -0.0078 *
(0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0295)
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0402 *** 0.7427 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt -0.0003 * -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0152) (0.0960) (0.0546)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 -0.0002
(0.0999)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0009 *** -0.0004 -0.0007 **
(0.0001) (0.1312) (0.0023)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 -0.0012 ***
(0.0000)
ROEt 0.0234 *** -0.0104 *** 0.0213 *** -0.0122 *** 0.0194 *** -0.0023
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1070)
ROEt-1 0.0134 *** -0.0111 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ROIt -0.0209 *** -0.0078 0.0250 ***
(0.0010) (0.2915) (0.0000)
ROIt-1 -0.0368 *** 0.2177 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt 0.0043 0.0005 -0.0099 *
(0.3661) (0.9316) (0.0120)
Adjusted ROIt-1 0.0117 *
(0.0331)
EBIT/INTt 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 * 0.0000 *** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0287) (0.0000) (0.3304)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *
(0.0004) (0.0499)
ROSt 0.4648 *** -0.0699 *** 0.4721 *** -0.3479 *** 0.3886 *** -0.4956 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROSt-1 0.0759 *** 0.4309 ***
(0.0001) (0.0000)
TAXt 0.0052 ** -0.0074 *** 0.0047 * -0.0042 * 0.0039 -0.0009
(0.0077) (0.0001) (0.0220) (0.0384) (0.0535) (0.5540)
TAXt-1 0.0046 * -0.0082 ***
(0.0223) (0.0000)
AV/STAFt 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.9483) (0.1021) (0.6794) (0.8571) (0.9435) (0.4734)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.4530) (0.5078)
AV/EMPLt
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt -0.0003 *** 0.0004 *** -0.0002 * 0.0003 *** -0.0002 *** 0.0001 *
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0207) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0125)
RFLAt-1 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0649) (0.1098)
R-squared 0.0214 0.3750 0.0275 0.3897 0.0744 0.7054
Adj. R-squared 0.0214 0.3749 0.0275 0.3895 0.0744 0.7052
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Semi-strong Weak Absence
IS BASEL THE RIGHT GATEWAY FOR A MORE EFFICIENT DEBT MARKET? AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON 
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POLAND
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.1030 *** 0.0131 0.0763 *** 0.0442 *** 0.0583 ** -0.0423 ***
(0.0000) (0.3601) (0.0003) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt 0.0031 *** -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0020 ***
(0.0000) (0.0885) (0.1279) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt-1 -0.0007 0.0001
(0.4559) (0.8775)
CA/CLt -0.0045 -0.0784 *** 0.0091 -0.1053 *** 0.0113 * 0.0134 ***
(0.2880) (0.0000) (0.2548) (0.0000) (0.0159) (0.0000)
CA/CLt-1 0.0035 0.0294 ***
(0.6239) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt -0.1629 * 0.2927 *** -0.1658 **
(0.0118) (0.0000) (0.0057)
WKCA/OPREt-1
WKCA/FIASt -0.0033 ** 0.0015 0.0013 0.0000 0.0004 0.0034 ***
(0.0042) (0.0640) (0.1415) (0.9644) (0.7214) (0.0000)
WKCA/FIASt-1 0.0015 0.0014
(0.4791) (0.3452)
CRED-DEBDt -0.0111 *** -0.0026 ** -0.0056 ** -0.0034 ** -0.0014 -0.0022 ***
(0.0000) -(0.0026) (0.0224) (0.0449) (0.2642) (0.0000)
CRED-DEBDt-1 0.0033 0.0031
(0.2242) (0.0948)
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt 0.0396 0.1172 *** 0.0632 ***
(0.3940) (0.0002) (0.0000)
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt -0.0436 * 0.1305 *** 0.0066 -0.0203 -0.0310 -0.0136
(0.0289) (0.0000) (0.8276) (0.3228) (0.0834) (0.1277)
FCFO/OPREt-1 0.0051 -0.1165 ***
(0.8225) (0.0000)
LEVt -0.0003 0.0033 * -0.0005 0.0045 *** -0.0003 0.0020 **
(0.8955) (0.0202) (0.7521) (0.0000) (0.8819) (0.0017)
LEVt-1 -0.0005 -0.0010
(0.7960) (0.4259)
DOLt (volume) 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9954) (0.6119) (0.9534) (0.4596) (0.9864) (0.7792)
DOLt-1 (volume) 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.9778) (0.1600)
DOLt (price) 0.0001 0.0012 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0010 *
(0.9685) (0.1723) (0.8238) (0.8819) (0.7173) (0.0219)
DOLt-1 (price) 0.0018 0.0005
(0.1316) (0.5246)
FIAS/OPREt -0.0363 *** 0.1498 *** -0.0274 ** 0.0480 ***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 -0.0436 *** 0.1751 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
INT/DEBt 0.0011 0.0056 ** 0.0009 0.0038 0.0010 0.0022 *
(0.6905) (0.0030) (0.7848) (0.1096) (0.6759) (0.0422)
INT/DEBt-1 -0.0004 0.0053 **
(0.9142) (0.0252)
DEB/OPREt -0.0599 ** 0.0228 -0.0077
(0.0044) (0.3936) (0.7528)
DEB/OPREt-1 0.7182 ***
(0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.6231) (0.8486) (0.7342)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 0.0006
(0.4955)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0034 0.0002 0.0006
(0.3796) (0.9493) (0.8611)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 0.0004
(0.9106)
ROEt 0.0188 * -0.0029 0.0133 ** 0.0026 0.0157 * -0.0001
(0.0112) (0.5733) (0.0269) (0.5151) (0.0143) (0.9676)
ROEt-1 0.0244 *** -0.0070
(0.0002) (0.1091)
ROIt -0.0288 ** 0.0124 -0.0215 ***
(0.0040) (0.3123) (0.0001)
ROIt-1 0.2414 ***
(0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt
Adjusted ROIt-1 -0.0194
(0.1132)
EBIT/INTt 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 **
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.6198) (0.0006) (0.0054)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 0.0000 ***
(0.3564) (0.0014)
ROSt 1.5770 *** 1.0061 *** 1.2525 *** -0.1831 1.1300 *** -0.0257
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0883) (0.0000) (0.5718)
ROSt-1 -0.0883 0.9509 ***
(0.5672) (0.0000)
TAXt -0.0004 -0.0170 -0.0029 -0.0046 -0.0006 -0.0090 *
(0.9753) (0.0804) (0.8277) (0.6027) (0.9611) (0.0386)
TAXt-1 -0.0046 -0.0029
(0.7238) (0.7414)
AV/STAFt 0.0117 *** 0.0017 0.0026 -0.0130 *** 0.0004 0.0055 ***
(0.0002) (0.4308) (0.5010) (0.0000) (0.8973) (0.0000)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0046 0.0071 ***
(0.2264) (0.0071)
AV/EMPLt
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt 0.0000 -0.0001 *** 0.0000 -0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.5739) (0.0000) (0.2720) (0.0000) (0.7099) (0.4678)
RFLAt-1
R-squared 0.0784 0.2989 0.0630 0.4116 0.1715 0.8187
Adj. R-squared 0.0781 0.2977 0.0623 0.4073 0.1705 0.8142
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Semi-strong Weak Absence
ACRN Oxford Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives 
Special Issue of Finance Risk and Accounting Perspectives, Vol.5 Issue 1, March 2016, p.22-51 
ISSN 2305-7394 
 
48 
 
SLOVAKIA
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.1598 *** 0.1177 0.0823 0.0028 0.1413 *** -0.0512
(0.0000) (0.1122) (0.1026) (0.9720) (0.0014) (0.3720)
CA/FIASt 0.0017 ** -0.0003 0.0022 0.0036 0.0029 ** 0.0003
(0.0339) (0.8268) (0.2438) (0.2082) (0.0461) (0.8754)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0057 ** -0.0013
(0.0392) (0.7624)
CA/CLt 0.0073 -0.0440 *** 0.0000 -0.0158 0.0020 -0.0107
(0.3192) (0.0017) (0.9963) (0.2196) (0.8027) (0.2972)
CA/CLt-1 -0.0005 -0.1048 ***
(0.9483) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt 0.0024
(0.3512)
WKCA/OPREt-1 -0.0103
(0.6880)
WKCA/FIASt -0.0011 -0.0015 0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0013
(0.4922) (0.6202) (0.7414) (0.2892) (0.6628)
WKCA/FIASt-1 -0.0189 *** -0.0157
(0.0020) (0.1006)
CRED-DEBDt 0.0068 *** -0.0032 0.0035 0.0546 *** 0.0071 ** 0.0018
(0.0084) (0.5162) (0.5661) (0.0000) (0.0172) (0.6314)
CRED-DEBDt-1 -0.0046 -0.0418 ***
(0.4530) (0.0000)
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt -0.0018 -0.4535 *** 0.0018 0.4056 ***
(0.8178) (0.0000) (0.8653) (0.0000)
FCFC/OPREt-1 0.1431 ***
(0.0000)
FCFO/OPREt -0.0029 -0.5564 *** -0.6049 ***
(0.7599) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FCFO/OPREt-1 -0.0714 ***
(0.0002)
LEVt -0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.0033 -0.0005 -0.0007
(0.9221) (0.8028) (0.9615) (0.6881) (0.9314) (0.9173)
LEVt-1 -0.0002 0.0004
(0.9765) (0.9601)
DOLt (volume) -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.8416) (0.7317) (0.9312) (0.8954) (0.8823) (0.8302)
DOLt-1 (volume) 0.0001 -0.0004
(0.9016) (0.7367)
DOLt (price) -0.0077 *** -0.0011 -0.0124 *** 0.0007 -0.0083 *** 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.7857) (0.0000) (0.8783) (0.0005) (0.9053)
DOLt-1 (price) 0.0140 *** 0.0008
(0.0000) (0.8638)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0036 0.1086 ***
(0.4313) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 0.0015 0.1013 ***
(0.8046) (0.0000)
INT/DEBt 0.0027 0.0075 -0.0002 0.0041 0.0031 0.0009
(0.7186) (0.5969) (0.9808) (0.7802) (0.7134) (0.9326)
INT/DEBt-1 0.0096 0.0056
(0.4460) (0.7740)
DEB/OPREt -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0017
(0.9721) (0.8875) (0.8299)
DEB/OPREt-1 -0.0010 0.3987 ***
(0.9117) (0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.6197) (0.8894) (0.6475)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 0.0000
(0.9943)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0004
(0.6484) (0.9883) (0.8769)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 0.0006
(0.8060)
ROEt 0.0167 -0.0119 0.0222 -0.0104 0.0264 -0.0112
(0.1984) (0.6348) (0.2434) (0.7273) (0.1449) (0.6315)
ROEt-1 0.0008 -0.0048
(0.9577) (0.8435)
ROIt -0.0098
(0.8425)
ROIt-1 -0.0158 0.0581 ***
(0.7578) (0.0000)
Adjusted ROIt -0.0008 0.0048 -0.0022
(0.9678) (0.9020) (0.8771)
Adjusted ROIt-1 0.0073
(0.8585)
EBIT/INTt 0.0003 *** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 ** -0.0001
(0.0067) (0.9798) (0.3767) (0.9850) (0.0435) (0.6427)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0018 *** -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.6390)
ROSt 0.0219 0.4307 *** 0.0820 0.2538 *** 0.1196 * 0.7752 ***
(0.3107) (0.0000) (0.1591) (0.0056) (0.0621) (0.0000)
ROSt-1 0.0207 0.0865
(0.7770) (0.4320)
TAXt 0.0149 -0.0155 0.0108 0.0368 0.0112 -0.0063
(0.7031) (0.8369) (0.8126) (0.6051) (0.8045) (0.9151)
TAXt-1 0.0088 -0.0164
(0.8391) (0.8083)
AV/STAFt 0.0008 -0.0152 *** 0.0030 0.0118 0.0009 0.0060 *
(0.7048) (0.0002) (0.5282) (0.1135) (0.7215) (0.0770)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0014 0.0476 ***
(0.7483) (0.0000)
AV/EMPLt
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt -0.0001 0.0100 *** -0.0003 0.0020 ***
(0.5375) (0.0000) (0.3281) (0.0000)
RFLAt-1 0.0000 0.0033 ***
(0.9206) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.0061 0.3291 0.0226 0.5814 0.0105 0.6976
Adj. R-squared 0.0061 0.3282 0.0224 0.5771 0.0104 0.6948
p-value (F-stat) 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
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UK
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const 0.1477 *** 0.0853 *** 0.1843 *** 0.0886 *** 0.1754 *** -0.0580 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.3028) (0.1351) (0.2838) (0.6350) (0.6238) (0.4153)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0002 ** 0.0001
(0.0652) (0.3303)
CA/CLt 0.0059 ** 0.0249 *** 0.0000 0.0179 *** 0.0067 * 0.0076 ***
(0.0887) (0.0000) (0.9998) (0.0000) (0.0680) (0.0000)
CA/CLt-1 0.0063 0.0241 ***
(0.2442) (0.0000)
WKCA/OPREt -0.1195 -1.1915 *** -1.0739 *** -0.1638 -0.2010 ***
(0.3136) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2123) (0.0001)
WKCA/OPREt-1 -0.1930
(0.1193)
WKCA/FIASt -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.4392) (0.2754) (0.1696) (0.4768) (0.5710) (0.6068)
WKCA/FIASt-1
CRED-DEBDt
CRED-DEBDt-1
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt 0.0096 -0.7371 *** 0.0377 -0.4201 *** 0.0002 -0.1954 ***
(0.7500) (0.0000) (0.1975) (0.0000) (0.9944) (0.0000)
FCFO/OPREt-1 -0.0364 -0.1577 ***
(0.2671) (0.0000)
LEVt -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.8772) (0.8681) (0.9830) (0.9134) (0.9298) (0.8382)
LEVt-1 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.8955) (0.9140)
DOLt (volume) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.8506) (0.9194) (0.7708) (0.6865) (0.8043) (0.3227)
DOLt-1 (volume) -0.0001 0.0000
(0.6647) (0.9774)
DOLt (price) -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0011 0.0003
(0.5650) (0.1329) (0.8240) (0.1622) (0.5297) (0.5821)
DOLt-1 (price) -0.0013 -0.0020
(0.4318) (0.1352)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0029 0.7522 *** 0.7659 *** 0.0027 0.2975 ***
(0.7963) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8360) (0.0000)
FIAS/OPREt-1 -0.0299 ***
(0.0063)
INT/DEBt 0.0003 0.0027 0.0025 0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0005
(0.9883) (0.8216) (0.8699) (0.9037) (0.9508) (0.9466)
INT/DEBt-1 -0.0005 0.0016
(0.9730) (0.8978)
DEB/OPREt -0.0049 0.0210 ** -0.0131
(0.5835) (0.0113) (0.2134)
DEB/OPREt-1 0.7069 ***
(0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9261) (0.8824) (0.9897)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 -0.0001
(0.6267)
DEB/EQUITYt 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.7863) (0.7467) (0.7942)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 -0.0001
(0.8276)
ROEt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9996) (0.9609) (0.9634) (0.9371) (0.9794) (0.9257)
ROEt-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.9881) (0.8654)
ROIt 0.0158 **
(0.0112)
ROIt-1 -0.0166 ***
(0.0083)
Adjusted ROIt -0.0008 0.0005
(0.8264) (0.8255)
Adjusted ROIt-1 0.0050
(0.3008)
EBIT/INTt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.2861) (0.5170) (0.9172) (0.3736) (0.2694) (0.8095)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0000 * 0.0000
(0.0559) (0.6104)
ROSt 0.8785 *** -1.5983 *** 0.5942 *** -1.5441 *** 0.6367 *** -0.2393 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROSt-1 0.2273 *** -1.2689 ***
(0.0002) (0.0000)
TAXt 0.0020 0.0030 0.0021 0.0046 0.0020 0.0071 **
(0.8099) (0.6102) (0.7856) (0.4726) (0.8276) (0.0423)
TAXt-1 -0.0018 0.0007
(0.8105) (0.9162)
AV/STAFt -0.0011 0.0119 *** 0.0077 0.0092 * 0.0021 -0.0091 ***
(0.7988) (0.0001) (0.1887) (0.0621) (0.6676) (0.0000)
AV/STAFt-1 -0.0080 0.0141 **
(0.2216) (0.0106)
AV/EMPLt
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ***
(0.4675) (0.0299) (0.9009) (0.1278) (0.5722) (0.0002)
RFLAt-1 0.0000 0.0000 **
(0.8203) (0.0460)
R-squared 0.0095 0.4851 0.0094 0.5099 0.0059 0.8463
Adj. R-squared 0.0095 0.4848 0.0094 0.5090 0.0059 0.8455
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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USA
Variable ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt ROIt DEB/OPREt
const -0.3303 3.4726 *** -0.1234 3.6704 *** -0.1844 * 2.8898 ***
(0.1919) (0.0000) (0.1536) (0.0000) (0.0931) (0.0000)
CA/FIASt -0.2848 *** 0.0057 -0.2180 *** 0.0047 -0.1593 *** -0.0791
(0.0000) (0.9188) (0.0000) (0.9495) (0.0000) (0.1150)
CA/FIASt-1 0.0151
(0.6920)
CA/CLt 0.1007 -1.0265 *** 0.1125 *** -1.2015 *** 0.0852 ** -0.6015 ***
(0.1966) (0.0000) (0.0029) (0.0000) (0.0118) (0.0000)
CA/CLt-1 0.3144
(0.1948)
WKCA/OPREt 0.3718 *** -0.5792 *** -0.5919 *** 0.1945 *** 0.0739
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5112)
WKCA/OPREt-1 0.0938 ***
(0.0022)
WKCA/FIASt -0.0176 0.0092 -0.0630 0.0013 0.1084 ***
(0.8780) (0.7349) (0.7165) (0.2924) (0.0000)
WKCA/FIASt-1 0.2278 *** -0.0100
(0.0000) (0.9380)
CRED-DEBDt
CRED-DEBDt-1
DEBLTt
DEBLTt-1
FCFC/OPREt -0.0005
(0.8621)
FCFC/OPREt-1
FCFO/OPREt
FCFO/OPREt-1 -0.0011 0.0165
(0.5847) (0.2526)
LEVt 0.0019 -0.0007 0.0015 0.0081 0.0024 0.0073
(0.9632) (0.9926) (0.9005) (0.9161) (0.8893) (0.9079)
LEVt-1 0.0032 -0.0024
(0.8038) (0.9763)
DOLt (volume) 0.0028 -0.0025 0.0002 -0.0024 0.0013 -0.0016
(0.7690) (0.8832) (0.9296) (0.8833) (0.7389) (0.9087)
DOLt-1 (volume) 0.0024 0.0022
(0.4920) (0.9213)
DOLt (price) 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0008 0.0004 0.0009 0.0000
(0.7126) (0.9403) (0.5380) (0.9623) (0.5167) (0.9952)
DOLt-1 (price) -0.0002 -0.0014
(0.8926) (0.8503)
FIAS/OPREt 0.0252 0.0343
(0.8157) (0.7064)
FIAS/OPREt-1
INT/DEBt -0.0346 0.0589 -0.0584 *** -0.0149
(0.5708) (0.5839) (0.0005) (0.5519)
INT/DEBt-1 -0.2110 *** -0.5048
(0.0018) (0.2473)
DEB/OPREt 0.0153 -0.0289 *** -0.0030
(0.2620) (0.0000) (0.6723)
DEB/OPREt-1 0.0881 ***
(0.0000)
DEB/EBITDAt 0.0003 0.0009 0.0004
(0.9610) (0.7276) (0.8889)
DEB/EBITDAt-1 -0.0007
(0.7150)
DEB/EQUITYt -0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0032
(0.7137) (0.6428) (0.5296)
DEB/EQUITYt-1 0.0013
(0.7413)
ROEt 0.1072 *** -0.0174 -0.0017 0.0178 0.0983 *** -0.0072
(0.0003) (0.7387) (0.9269) (0.8742) (0.0000) (0.8821)
ROEt-1 -0.0333 -0.0495
(0.0943) (0.6967)
ROIt -0.0718
(0.6904)
ROIt-1 0.0072
(0.5222)
Adjusted ROIt 0.0706
(0.1059)
Adjusted ROIt-1 -0.0096
(0.8400)
EBIT/INTt 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 * 0.0002
(0.4404) (0.4262) (0.2786) (0.8649) (0.0675) (0.3858)
EBIT/INTt-1 0.0001 0.0002
(0.2609) (0.6142)
ROSt
ROSt-1 -0.0344
(0.4041)
TAXt 0.0156 -0.0238 0.0039 0.0124 0.0074 -0.0359
(0.8638) (0.8821) (0.9195) (0.9604) (0.8781) (0.7908)
TAXt-1 0.0138 -0.0600
(0.6686) (0.7720)
AV/STAFt 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002
(0.5001) (0.9581) (0.8846) (0.7452) (0.3684) (0.8951)
AV/STAFt-1 0.0006 0.0001
(0.1269) (0.9837)
AV/EMPLt 0.0010 -0.0480 *** -0.0039 *** -0.0823 *** -0.0002 -0.0762 ***
(0.6378) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8269) (0.0000)
AV/EMPLt-1
RLFAt
RFLAt-1
R-squared 0.0608 0.4941 0.4972 0.6568 0.1394 0.6156
Adj. R-squared 0.0601 0.4894 0.4826 0.6393 0.1376 0.6090
p-value (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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